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Abstract—Neural networks are being applied in many
tasks related to IoT with encouraging results. For
example, neural networks can precisely detect human,
objects and animal via surveillance camera for security
purpose. However, neural networks have been recently
found vulnerable to well-designed input samples that
called adversarial examples. Such issue causes neural
networks to misclassify adversarial examples that are
imperceptible to humans. We found giving a rotation
to an adversarial example image can defeat the effect
of adversarial examples. Using MNIST number images
as the original images, we first generated adversarial
examples to neural network recognizer, which was com-
pletely fooled by the forged examples. Then we rotated
the adversarial image and gave them to the recognizer
to find the recognizer to regain the correct recognition.
Thus, we empirically confirmed rotation to images can
protect pattern recognizer based on neural networks
from adversarial example attacks.
Index Terms—Neural networks, security and privacy,
adversarial examples
I. Introduction
Recently, neural networks have achieved very impressive
success on a wide range of fields like computer vision [1]
and natural language processing [2]. There are many tasks
that have been used by neural networks close to human-
performance, such as image classification [3], sentence
classification [4], voice synthesis [5] and object detection
[6]. In the Internet of Things (IoT), one of the problems
is how to reliably process real-world data is captured from
IoT devices. And neural networks are considered to be the
most promising method to solve this problem [7]. Despite
great successes in numerous of applications in IoT [9],
many machine learning applications are raising great con-
cerns in the field of security and privacy. Recent research
has shown that machine learning models are vulnerable to
adversarial examples [10]. Adversarial examples are well-
designed inputs that are created by adding adversarial per-
turbations. Machine learning systems have been developed
following the assumption that the environment is benign
during both training and testing. Intuitively, the inputs
X are assumed to all be get from the same distribution
at both training and test time. This means that while
test inputs X are news and previously unseen during the
training process, they at least have the same properties
as the inputs used for training. These assumptions are
advantageous for creating a powerful machine learning
model but this rule also makes an attacker be able to
alter the distribution at the either training time [11] or
testing time [12]. Typical training attacks [13] try to
inject adversarial training data into the original training
set to wrongly train the deep learning models. However,
most of existing adversarial attacks are focused on testing
phase attacks [14] [16] because it is more reliable while
training phase attacks are more difficult for implementing
because attackers should exploit the machine learning
system before executing an attack on it. For example,
an attacker might slightly modify an image [11] to cause
it to be recognized incorrectly or alter the code of an
executable file to enable it to bypass a malware detector
[17]. For dealing with the existence of adversarial samples,
many research works are proposing defense mechanisms for
adversarial examples. For examples, Papernot et al. [18]
used the distillation algorithm for defending to adversarial
perturbations. However, Carnili et al. [19] pointed out that
method is not effective for improving the robustness of a
deep neural network system. Weilin et al. [20] proposed the
feature squeezing for detecting adversarial examples, and
there are several other adversarial detection approaches
[14] [16].
In this paper, we study the robustness of neural net-
works through the very simple technique but very effective
is rotation. Firstly, we craft the adversarial examples by
using the FGSM algorithm [10] on the MNIST dataset
[21]. Afterwards, we apply the rotation algorithm on those
adversarial examples and evaluate our method through
machine learning system [22]. The results show that our
method is very effective for making neural networks more
robustness against adversarial examples.
II. Background and related work
In this section, we provide the background about ad-
versarial attack and specify some of the notations that we
use in this paper. We denote x is the original image from
a given dataset X, and y denotes the class that is belong
to the class space Y . The ground truth label is denoted
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by ytrue. And x∗ denotes the adversarial example that is
generated from x. Given an input x, its feature vector at
layer i is fi(x), and its predicted probability class of y is
p(y|x).yx = argmaxxp(x|y) is predicted class of x. L(x, y)
denotes the loss function of given input x and target class
y.
A. Adversarial attack methods
The adversarial examples and their counterparts are de-
fined as indistinguishable from humans. Because it is hard
to model human perception, researchers use three popular
distance metrics to approximate human’s perception based
on the Lp norm:
||x||p =
( n∑
i=1
|xi|p
) 1
p
(1)
Researchers usually use L0, L2, L∞ metrics for express-
ing the different aspects of visual significance. L0 counts
the number of pixels with different values at corresponding
positions in two images. It describes how many pixels are
changed between two images. L2 is used for measuring
the Euclidean distance between two images. And L∞ will
help to measure the maximum difference for all pixels
at corresponding positions in two images. There is no
agreement which distance metric is the best so it depends
on the proposed algorithms.
Szegedy et al. [23] used a method name L-BFGS
(Limited-memory Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno) to
create targeted adversarial examples. This method min-
imize the weighted sum of perturbation size ε and loss
function L(x∗, ytarget) while constraining the elements of
x∗ to be normal pixel value.
Goodfellow et al. [10] consumed that adversarial ex-
amples can be caused by cumulative effects of high di-
mensional model weights. They proposed a simple attack
method, called Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM):
x∗ = x+ ε · sign(OxL(x, y)) (2)
where ε denotes the perturbation size for crafting adver-
sarial example x∗ from original input x. Given a clean
image x, this method try to create a similar image x∗ in
L∞ neighborhood of x that fools the target classifier. This
leads to maximize loss function L(x, y) which is the cost
of classifying image x as the target label y. Fast gradient
sign method solves this problem by performing one step
gradient update from x in the input space with small size
of perturbation ε. Increasing ε will lead to higher and
faster attack success rate however it maybe also makes
your adversarial sample to be more difference to original
input. FGSM computes the gradients for once, so it is
much more efficient than L-BFGS. This method is very
simple however it is fast and powerful for creating the
adversarial examples. So in this paper, we use this method
for attack phase. The model is used to create adversarial
attacks is called the attacking model. When the attacking
model is the target model itself or contains the target
model, the resulting attacks are white-box. In this work,
we also implement our method on white-box manner.
B. Defense methods
Many research works focused on the adversarial train-
ing [24], [25] to resist adversarial attacks for a machine
learning system from. This strategy aims to use the
adversarial examples to train a machine learning model
to make it more robust. Some researchers combine data
augmentation with adversarial perturbed data for training
[23]–[25]. However, this method is more time consuming
than traditional training on only clean images, because an
extra training dataset will be added to training set and it
is clearly that will take more time than in usual. Other
defense strategy is pre-processing based methods that try
to remove the perturbation noise before feeding data into
a machine learning model. Osadchy et al. [26] use some of
filters to remove the adversarial noise, such as the median
filter, Gaussian low-pass filter. Meng el al. [27] proposed
a two phases defense model. First phase is to detect the
adversarial input and the second one reforms original
input based on the difference between the manifolds of
original and adversarial examples. Another adversarial de-
fense direction is based on gradient masking method [25].
This defense strategy performs gradient masking typically
result in a model that is very smooth in specific directions
and neighborhoods of training data, which makes it harder
for attackers to find gradients indicating good candidate
directions to perturb the input in a damaging way. Paper-
not et al. [18] adapts distillation to adversarial defense, and
uses the output of another machine learning model as soft
labels to train the target model. Nayebi et al. [29] use satu-
rating networks for robustness to adversarial examples. In
that paper, the loss function is designed to encourage the
activations to be in their saturating regime. Gu et al. [30]
propose the deep contrastive network, which uses a layer-
wise contrastive penalty term to achieve output invariance
to input perturbation. However, with methods based on
gradient masking, attackers can train a substitute model:
a copy that imitates the defended model by observing the
labels that the defended model assigns to inputs chosen
carefully by the adversary.
C. Neural network architecture
In this section, we will describe about the neural net-
works (NNs) architecture that we use in this paper. We
use Lenet-5 [22], that is a convolutional network used in
our experiments. NNs learn hierarchical representations of
high dimensional inputs used to solve machine learning
tasks, including classification, detection or recognition
[31]. This network comprises seven layers not counting the
input, all of which contain weights (trainable parameters).
The input data is a 32 × 32 pixel image. As Fig. 1,
convolutional layers are labeled Ci, subsampling layers are
labeled Si, and fully connected layers are labeled Fi, where
i is the layer index.
Layer C1 is convolutional layer with six feature maps.
Each unit in each feature map is connected to a 5 × 5
neighborhood in the input. The size of the feature maps
is 28× 28 which prevents connection from the input from
falling off the boundary. And layer C1 consists 122,304
connections. Layer S2 is a subsampling layer with six
feature maps of size 14× 14. This layer reduces the size of
features in previous layer. Layer C3 is a convolutional layer
with 16 feature maps that each unit in each feature map is
connected to several 5×5 neighborhoods at identical loca-
tions in a subset of S2’s feature maps. This layer contains
156,000 connections. Next layer is S4, a subsampling layer
with 16 feature maps of size 5 × 5. This layer has 2000
connections. The layer C5 is a convolutional layer that
has 120 feature maps. Each unit in this layer is connected
to a 5 × 5 neighborhoods on all 16 of S4’s feature maps.
This layer contains 48,120 connections. The last layer is F6
has 84 units and is fully connected to previous layer C5.
This layer consists 10,164 trainable parameters. For more
intuitive, the input of each layer fi is the output of the
previous layer fi−1 multiplied by a set of weights, which
are part of the layer’s parameter θi. A neural net can be
viewed as a composition of parameterized functions:
f : x 7→ fn(θn, ..., f2(θ2, f1(θ1, x))...) (3)
where θ = {θi} are parameters learned during training
phase. In the case of classification, the network is given
a large collection of known input-label pairs (x, y) and
adjusts its parameters θ to reduce the label prediction
error f(x)−y on these inputs. At test time, the model ex-
trapolates from its training data to make predictions f(x)
on unseen inputs. For more understanding, the FGSM
equation (2) that we describe in previous section, can be
described as:
δx = ε · sign(OxL(f, x, y)) (4)
where f is the targeted network, L(f, x, y) is cost function
and y is label of input x. An adversarial sample x∗ = x+δx
is successfully crafted when misclassified by convolutional
network f if it satisfies f(x∗) 6= f(x) while its perturbation
factor δx still remains indistinguishable to humans.
III. Our system
The goal of adversarial examples is to make a machine
learning model to mis-classify an input data by changing
the objective function value based on it’s gradients on the
adversarial direction.
A. White-box targeted attack
We consider the white-box targeted attack settings,
where the attacker can fully access into the model type,
model architecture, all trainable parameters and the ad-
versary aims to change the classifier’s prediction to some
specific target class. To create adversarial samples that
are misclassified by machine learning model, an adver-
sary with knowledge of the model f and its trainable
parameters θ. In this work, we use FGSM [10] method for
crafting adversarial examples. We define classifier function
f : Rn → {1...k} that mapping image pixel value vectors
to a particular label. Then we assume that function f has
a loss function L : Rn × {1...k}→ R. For an input image
x ∈ Rn and target label y ∈ {1...k}, our system aims to
solve the following optimization problem: θ + L(x + θ, y)
subject to x + θ ∈ [0, 1]n , where δ is perturbation noise
that we add to original image x. We have to note that
this function method would yield the solution for f(x) in
the case of convex losses, however the neural networks are
non-convex so we end up with an approximation in this
case.
B. Rotation - affine transformation
Affine transformations have been widely used in com-
puter vision [32]. So it has an importance role in computer
vision. Now we define the range of defense that we want
to optimize over. For rotation manner that is one of an
affine transformations, we find the parameter (u∗, v∗, α)
that rotating the adversarial image with degree around
the center will make classifier can remove the adversarial
noise. Formally, the pixel at position (u, v) is rotated
counterclockwise, and then multiplied by a rotation matrix
that calculated from the angle α:[
u∗
v∗
]
=
[
cosα − sinα
sinα cosα
]
·
[
u
v
]
(5)
So the vectors
[
u
v
]
and
[
u∗
v∗
]
have the same magnitude
and they are separated by an given angle α. In our re-
search, we set angle α ∈ [1, 90] and our experiments show
that we can find the best angle that it defeats completely
the adversarial noise and re-recognize the correct image.
When we apply rotation technique on the adversarial
examples that are generated by FGSM, we observe that
adversarial examples are failure with rotation. For more
intuitive, supposing we have original data (x, y) and model
f . So our prediction label is yp = f(x). And the loss
function L(y, yp) shows us how far yp is away from y.
When we apply FGSM for crafting adversarial examples,
the purpose is to increase the loss function L(y, yp) by
add a small adversarial noise to original input x. Recall the
FGSM algorithm, equation (2) will be turn to the equation
as bellow:
x∗ = x+ ε · sign
(
∂L(y, yp)
∂x
)
(6)
We aim to solve equation (6) by maximize loss function
L(y, yp) instead of L(x, y) in equation (2). The logits
(vector of raw prediction) is the output of the neural
network before we feed them into the softmax activation
function for normalizing, it is described as:
logits = f(x) (7)
ypred = softmax(logits) (8)
L(y, yp) = CrossEntropy(y, yp) (9)
By calculating partial derivative of function (9), we have:
∂L(y, yp)
∂x
= ∂L(y, yp)
∂logits
∂logits
∂x
= ∂L(y, yp)
∂f(x)
∂f(x)
∂x
= (yp − y)∂f(x)
∂x
(10)
From equation (10), it is clear that ∂f(x)∂x is influenced
by product of trainable weights and activations. For ex-
amples, when we have two images with the same label,
their activations in any fixed networks are similar and
the weights of the network are unchanged. Consequently,
∂f(x)
∂x is a constant for any given image x with the same
class. This means the gradient is highly correlated with
true label y. Because of this property, when attacker added
the adversarial noise, the classifying x∗ becomes a simpler
problem than the original problem of classifying x, as x∗
contains extra information from the added noise. However,
with a small change in input data (by rotating adversarial
images with a particular angle) that system makes an
another decision. And in this case, we show that neural
network recognizes the rotated adversarial images as true
label instead of targeted label. Our system is described as
in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Our system: from original images, we create the adversarial
examples by using FGSM method on Lenet-5, after that we rotate
the adversarial images with degree in range [0,90] and finally, using
the Lenet- 5 for classifying
IV. Experiments and results
Based on the understanding of the problem we described
in previous sections, now we can apply our approach to
defeat the adversarial examples for protecting a machine
learning system. As our experiments are demonstrated
as below, we should note two importance points: a) our
approach can remove the adversarial examples, b) our
approach still keep neural network’s performance is good
enough and in some case the neural network performs
equal or better than on rotated adversarial images.
A. Experimental setup
We use the MNIST dataset [21], that is a very well-
known handwritten digits data in both deep learning and
security field. The dataset includes 50,000 training images,
10,000 validation images and 10,000 test images. Each
28 × 28 gray-scale pixel image is encoded as a vector of
intensities whose real values range from 0 (for black color)
to 1 (for white color).
B. Results
We select randomly 10 images in the same category, and
name them as original images. We consider the white-box
targeted attack so we also randomly choose a targeted
label for crafting our targeted adversarial images. In our
implementation, the random original input classes are 1
and 6 while random targeted adversarial are 8 and 9
respectively. In attacking phase, we run 20 iterations for
crafting adversarial examples with a step size of 0.01 (we
choose to take gradient steps in the norm L when using
FGSM algorithm).
Fig. 2. Rotated Original Image (original digit 1, targeted image 8)
In the first implementation with 10 random inputs are
digit 1 and targeted adversarial samples is 8. Fig. 3 shows
the one adversarial image with targeted digit is 8. The
first column shows the adversarial image, and second
one describes the classification result after we rotate the
adversarial image. The horizontal axis is angle of rotation,
that we change angle degree from 0 to 90 and observe
the probabilities changing in vertical axis. When degree
of angle is 0, it is clear that the classification accuracy
of machine learning system recognizes the image as digit
1 is 0. However, this curve rapidly increases with degree
of angle and it reaches a peak at angle of rotation is 39
with highest classification rate as digit 1 is around 99.3%.
This result confirms that our approach works well on the
adversarial image in this case.
Fig. 3. Rotated Adversarial Image (original digit 1, targeted image
8)
We also compare the difference of classification accuracy
between rotated adversarial image and rotated original
image. Fig. 2 shows the rotation - affine transformation
takes an importance role in image classification problem
when it can make classification accuracy lead to the
highest score.
Fig. 4. Classification result on original image (digit 1), adversarial
image (targeted digit 8) and rotated adversarial image
In Fig. 4, the first row shows the original image (digit
1) and classification accuracy rate for recognizing it as
digit 1 is 99.9% on Lenet-5. The second row shows the
adversarial image and classification rate as digit 1 dropped
to 0.22% while machine learning system thinks that image
as digit 8 with probability in 97.1%. And the last row
shows the rotated adversarial image at angle of rotation is
39 degree. In this case, the system recognizes it as digit 1 at
99.3% probability while for digit 8 dropped from 97.1% to
0.2%. So in this implementation, it demonstrates that our
approach can completely remove adversarial example and
remains the system performance for classification task.
Fig. 5. Rotated adversarial image (original digit 6, targeted image
digit 9)
We observe the changing classification rate between
original image and rotated adversarial image. Table I
shows the classification accuracy for original, adversarial
and rotated images in our first implementation. The first
TABLE I
CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY RATE STATISTICS
Image
index
Classification Accuracy (%) Changing
rate
between
(a)-(c)
Original
digit 1
(a)
Adversarial
digit 8
(b)
Rotated
Adv (degree)
(c)
7463 100 96.1 99.8 (26) 0.2
1773 94.2 96.9 96.2 (20) 2.0
9737 100 96.7 99.8 (27) 0.2
7738 99.5 97.2 99.5 (38) 0
9071 92.0 97.3 48.7 (10) 43.3
7399 100 96.5 99.5 (34) 0.5
3765 100 97.6 90.4 (15) 9.6
6670 99.9 97.5 100 (35) 0.1
9896 100 95.8 99.5 (31) 0.5
228 100 96.0 99.4 (19) 0.6
column in table I is the image index in MNIST dataset
that we randomly select for the experiment. We note
that when we apply our approach, the neural net can
recognize the correct label with slightly decrease accuracy
to compare to original recognition. However, in all of cases
the adversarial examples are no longer effect on the neural
net.
In the second implementation, we randomly choose 10
inputs as digit 6 and set the targeted adversarial examples
is 9. Fig. 5 shows one of 10 adversarial images for demon-
stration. In this case, the rotated adversarial image is also
recognized by system as digit 6 with 100% probability at
angle of rotation is 28 degree.
Fig. 6. Classification result on original image (digit 6), adversarial
image (targeted digit is 9) and rotated adversarial image
In Fig. 6, for given input image digit 6, the system
recognizes it as digit 6 with 100% confidence. In attacking
phase, this classification rate dropped to 0.21% for recog-
nizing digit 6 and 95.6% for targeted digit 9. Surprisingly,
in this case after rotating, the classification rate as digit
6 recovers in a perfect rate at 100%. So that means our
approach completely removes the influence of adversarial
and keeps the system up to high performance.
V. Conclusion
Adversarial attack so far is a very serious problem for
security and privacy on machine learning system. Our re-
search work provide evidence that the neural networks can
be made more robustness to adversarial attacks. As our
theory and experiments, we now can develop a powerful
defense method for adversarial problem. Our experiments
on MNIST have not reached the best on all of cases.
However, our results already show that our approach lead
to significant increase in the robustness of the neural
network. And we also believe that our findings will be
further explored in our future work.
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